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How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley 
and Wendel  
Forthcoming, 23 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2010) 
 
DAVID LUBAN 
 
Alice Woolley and Brad Wendel tackle an important but 
underdiscussed problem in legal ethics:  the problem of connecting 
normative theories about professional duties with a plausible psychology 
of action.  As they felicitously put it, legal ethics must answer not only 
questions about what a lawyer must do, but also questions about how a 
lawyer must be—their shorthand, I take it, for “how a lawyer must be in 
order to do what (according to the theory) a lawyer must do.”  They 
plausibly suggest that ethical theories offer not only maxims of obligation 
and moral reasoning, but also idealized portraits of the moral agent.  
Actions that come easily to one personality type may be excruciatingly 
painful or embarrassing to another. Once we notice this crucial connection 
between actions and personality, we open up a new dimension for 
evaluating the theories: evaluating the portrait of the moral agent implicit 
in the theory. 
Viewed in this light (they argue), theories of legal ethics that might 
otherwise seem plausible can fail if they turn out to require lawyers to be 
an implausible kind of person, in one or more of the following ways: 
someone who is a misfit in the professional settings in which lawyers 
ordinarily work; someone who must possess cognitive capacities and 
moral virtues at an unrealistically high level; or someone whose overall 
personality turns out to be morally undesirable. Here I am paraphrasing 
the three criteria Woolley and Wendel specify for evaluating conceptions 
of how a lawyer must be: “whether that conception is functional, realistic 
or desirable.”1 
Using these criteria, they raise doubts about the theories of William 
Simon, Charles Fried, and me.  According to Woolley and Wendel, 
Simon’s theory requires lawyers who are mavericks, and my theory 
requires lawyers who are (excessively?) moralistic; both are highly 
individualist to an extent that might make the legal profession impossible 
to regulate, and both require lawyers who are unusually smart and 
itive biases.  Fried’s theory, on the other unrealistically free from cogn
                                                        
 University Professor and Professor of Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University 
Law Center. 
1  Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS XX, 38 (2010). 
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hand, requires lawyers whose combination of moral skepticism, 
institutional complacency, and uncritical loyalty to clients may be morally 
undesirable.2 
Embedded in Woolley and Wendel’s critique of Simon, Fried, and me 
is their own picture of “how an ethical lawyer should be.” Woolley and 
Wendel are particularly concerned with the regulation of the legal 
profession, and thus with lawyers’ attitudes toward law in general, 
particularly toward professional regulations.  That attitude should be, in a 
phrase Wendel has used elsewhere, one of “civil obedience.”3  
Intellectually, the lawyer should be a master of the law of lawyering:  
disciplinary rules, tort and agency rules, and agency regulations of lawyer 
conduct.  She should recognize professional duties as obligations of 
political morality, not individual morality.4  And she should obey these 
duties, even if they conflict with her own moral convictions.  In other 
words, she should be law-abiding as a matter of political principle.  
Transposing this requirement into the psychological categories Woolley 
and Wendel favor, it appears that she should be emotionally identified as a 
citizen first and a moralist second; and, further, that she should be 
temperamentally capable of suppressing her urge to pass moral judgment.  
It would be interesting to ask the same questions of Woolley and Wendel’s 
ideal lawyer that they ask about Simon, Fried, and me; that is beyond the 
scope of this paper, though, and I will content myself with responding to 
their criticisms. 
In the comments that follow, I first discuss Woolley and Wendel’s 
three criteria for evaluating “how a lawyer must be.”  Woolley and 
Wendel do not explain the connection between these criteria, nor whether 
the criteria are consistent with each other, nor whether they are 
independent of each other. In my view, asking whether a conception of the 
moral agent is functional, realistic, or desirable are quite different 
questions.  In Section I, I discuss the criterion of realism, under two 
possible interpretations:  that a conception of a moral agent is unrealistic if 
it is, quite literally, impossible for agents to fulfill, and that the conception 
is unrealistic if it is merely difficult to fulfill.  I argue that neither Simon’s 
conception nor mine is impossible, and that being difficult to fulfill is not 
in itself a legitimate reason for rejecting a conception of moral agency. 
This section concludes by contrasting my conception of ethics as choice 
under the practical assumption of human freedom with Woolley and 
Wendel’s more deterministic approach.  
                                                        
2  In this response I shall have nothing to say about Woolley and Wendel’s  discussion of 
Fried.  My focus is on their discussion of my own view and Simon’s view, which are 
much nearer to each other than either is to Fried’s. 
3  W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363 (2004). 
4  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 37. 
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Section II takes up the issues of functionality and desirability.  I argue 
that neither Simon’s theory nor mine requires a lawyer with a 
dysfunctional or undesirable personality.   In the conclusion, I speculate 
that focusing (as I do) on the ethical demands of professional life, without 
discussing the many other dimensions of being human, may make a theory 
sound more relentlessly moralistic than it really is.  A book exclusively 
devoted to ethics is not an assertion that ethics is our exclusive devotion. 
 
I. “REALISTIC” 
 
A. “BEING UNREALISTIC” UNDERSTOOD AS IMPOSSIBILITY 
 
Start with the requirement of realism, about which I shall have the 
most to say.  At one point, Woolley and Wendel ask whether Simon’s 
theory and mine are “the equivalent of wanting basketball players who are 
12 feet tall.”5  In an obvious way, any ethical theory must be at least 
minimally realistic:  it cannot require the impossible—the meaning of 
Kant’s famous maxim that “ought” implies “can.”6  A moment’s thought 
shows that this maxim applies not only to the physical possibility of doing 
what the moral theory says we must do, but also to the intellectual 
possibility of carrying out the kind of deliberation the theory asks of us, 
and the emotional possibility of motivating ourselves to do what we ought. 
At the very least, “ought implies can” means that a moral theory must 
not be too computationally complex for the human brain.  Woolley and 
Wendel worry that William Simon’s account of legal ethics—which 
apparently requires sophisticated legal analysis at every turn—might place 
unrealistic cognitive demands on lawyers. As Woolley and Wendel note, 
“Simon’s lawyer is very much intended to be the counterpart to Dworkin’s 
ideal judge Hercules, who is called upon to construct a coherent political-
normative account that explains and justifies the holding in any given 
case.”7  That means that the good lawyer, for Simon, is “a person of 
awesome cognitive capabilities.”8 Some years ago, I voiced a similar 
concern about Simon’s theory.9  But obviously Simon’s approach is not 
e of being too computationally complex for literally impossible in the sens
                                                        
5  Id. at 32. 
6  Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It is of 
No Use in Practice (1793), reprinted in THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF 
KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY, at 289, *8: 287 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1996)(1793) [hereinafter PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY].  Kant doesn’t use the 
modern “ought implies can” formulation, which first appeared in Sidgwick’s The 
Methods of Ethics (1st ed. 1874). 
7  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 20. 
8  Id. at 21. 
9  David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 893-96 
(1999).  
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the human mind.  The analyses Simon offers in The Practice of Justice are 
complex to roughly the extent that an exam answer in a law school class 
on labor law or tax policy is complex.  To determine whether (in Simon’s 
example that Woolley and Wendel borrow) union busting by a university 
is substantively unjust, the university’s counsel needs to analyze the 
purposes and policies behind statutes and apply her analysis to the 
university’s situation.  In my earlier paper about Simon, I worried that it is 
unrealistic (meaning impossible) to expect super-sophisticated reasoning 
from lawyers operating under deadlines.  Simon actually agrees with this, 
and argues that when the lawyer is operating under time or resource 
constraints, she must fall back on “presumptive responses to broad 
categories of situations.”10 
I am inclined to accept this response.  Of course in the university 
hypothetical, the lawyer almost certainly has time to think through 
whether the representation is just; but, if she has not, a “presumptive 
response” might be that union busting is almost certainly inconsistent with 
the broad (and just) purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.  Even 
with such a presumption, the analysis of legal justice is not a trivial 
exercise, but it is hardly above the pay grade of a university counsel who 
works on labor-management issues.  If, for example, her boss were to ask 
her to produce a legal memorandum detailing the arguments the union 
local might make if the case ended up in litigation, the lawyer would 
probably come up with something very similar to Simon’s analysis. 
Thus, Simon’s theory does not really require the impossible.  But what 
if it did, at least for some lawyers?  Suppose that some lawyers simply 
don’t have enough upstairs to successfully do the kind of analysis Simon 
asks of them.  Then, arguably, “ought implies can” mitigates moral 
criticism for getting the wrong answer.11  However, it doesn’t relieve them 
of the obligation to try to figure out what substantive legal justice requires, 
even if they get it wrong.  Surely it is open to Simon to respond that he 
offers his examples only as “model answers”; the injunction at the heart of 
his theory is that lawyers should value substantive justice and aim to 
figure it out using standard methods of legal analysis, not that they must 
get the same answers Simon does. 
 
B.  “BEING UNREALISTIC” UNDERSTOOD AS PSYCHOLOGICAL DIFFICULTY 
 
So much for the requirem
unrealistic if they ask the imp
ent that ethical theories must be rejected as 
ossible; it is a valid criterion, but it does not 
                                                        
10  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 157 (1998). 
11 How much intellectual error mitigates blameworthiness is of course open to 
debate. We usually do not accept the excuse of intellectual incapacity from 
professional people (lawyers, doctors, engineers) when they malpractice; but we 
might if getting the right answer demands extraordinary brilliance. 
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rule out very much.  But there is another, weaker sense of realism that 
concerns difficulty rather than impossibility.  This notion routinely 
appears, for example, in public debates about how best to address the 
social problem of teenage sex, pregnancy, and STDs.  Some people 
promote abstinence-only.  Others criticize abstinence-only as unrealistic.  
By “unrealistic,” the latter don’t mean that abstinence is physically or 
cognitively impossible.  What they mean is that abstinence is an uphill 
struggle, uphill enough that abstinence-only education is likely to fail.12 
Given the intensity of sexual desire, teens’ susceptibility to peer group 
pressure, adolescent impulsivity, and Mother Nature’s hormone cocktail, it 
is unrealistic to expect many teenagers to abstain from sex, even if in 
some sense they agree with their high school teacher about the virtues of 
abstinence. 
Obviously, the difficulty of abstinence is not the same as literal 
impossibility.  Kant illustrated the difference with a characteristically 
ghastly example: 
 
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination that, when the 
desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible to 
him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected in front of the house 
where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it 
immediately after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his 
inclination.  One need not conjecture very long what he would reply.13 
 
This seems to be the main sense in which Woolley and Wendel use 
the term “unrealistic”—not to assert that an ethical stance requires lawyers 
to be something that is literally impossible for them to be, but merely that 
it demands an uphill struggle.  For example, they comment that Simon’s 
requirement that lawyers should be committed to impartial justice “seems 
rather unrealistic in a world in which both clients and law firms are 
 of norms, not necessarily those of impartial 
 mean that the human brain is incapable of 
committed to a distinctive set
justice.”14  Plainly they don’t
                                                        
12  A recent study has apparently cast doubt on assertions that abstinence-only is doomed 
to failure.  Tamar Lewin, Quick Response to Study of Abstinence Education, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2010, at A18.  Let me make clear that I am not taking sides in the debates over the 
efficacy of abstinence education or the morality of teenage sex; I am simply using it as an 
example. 
13  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 6, at 163, *5:30.  Of course some might disagree as to the 
predicted outcome, as Thom Gunn did in his very naughty little poem Courage, A Tale, 
in THOM GUNN, COLLECTED POEMS 292 (1994). 
14 Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 18.  On the merits, this remark seems a bit 
question-begging against Simon — it assumes that other lawyers in the law firm are not 
going to have the commitment to impartial justice that Simon commends; but of course 
Simon is commending the pursuit of justice to all the lawyers in the firm, and the 
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impartial justice (tell that to a judge, whose job description requires 
impartial justice).  They mean that it is unrealistic to expect lawyers to go 
against the grain of the institutions in which they work and against the 
clients who pay them. 
This is where the psychological concepts Woolley and Wendel 
invoke—not only cognition, but also “disposition or personality,”15 or 
again “emotion, dispositions, and virtue”16—come in.  A morality that 
requires people to act in a way that runs against the grain of their 
dispositions, personality, or emotions is an unrealistic morality.  It’s just 
too damn hard.  Or, flipping the argument around, a morality that requires 
people to be the kind of person to whom such acts don’t run against the 
grain is unrealistic if most of us are not that kind of person.  Thus they 
write, “It seems odd to ground a general theory of ethical lawyering, 
intended to be applicable to all lawyers, on a complex of personal 
characteristics that occurs only infrequently, in the form of exceptionally 
courageous and individualistic people.”17 
I am not convinced that this is a legitimate way of criticizing a moral 
theory, for several reasons.  First, and most important, is that any 
acceptable moral theory will be unrealistic in this sense.  Consider the 
famous Milgram experiments in social psychology, in which subjects are 
set the task of punishing another subject with escalating electrical shocks 
for getting wrong answers in a memorization exercise.  In reality, the 
shocks are fake and the other subject is a confederate of the experimenter; 
the purpose of the experiment is to see how far people will go in following 
a patently outrageous order.  Milgram’s stunning finding is that almost 
two-thirds of the subjects he tested went all the way to a seemingly-lethal 
shock level (despite screams from the man at the other hand, pleas about 
his heart condition, and eventual ominous silence).18  The findings were 
robust across many replications in many cultures.19 Apparently, most of us 
                                                                                                                                          
problem of a lawyer going against the grain arises only when we assume a world in 
which only a few lawyers adopt Simon’s approach to ethics while most of the lawyers 
around them, including those in their firm, do not.  Under that assumption, any system of 
legal ethics will be unrealistic. 
15  Id. at 4. 
16  Id. at 5. 
17  Id. at 33. 
18  STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 56-57 
(1974); see also ARTHUR G. MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY OF 
CONTROVERSY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1986).  I analyze these experiments in some detail in 
chapter 7 of DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 237 (2007), “The Ethics 
of Wrongful Obedience.” 
19  See MILLER, supra note 18, at, 86-87.  The experiments seem to have leaked over to 
popular culture, in unscientific replications of the Milgram experiment by TV producers 
in the U.K. and France.  See the British video at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y6GxIuljT3w; on the French version, see French 
Contestants Torture Each Other on TV Game of Death, U.K. TELEGRAPH, Mar. 17, 2010, 
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find it extremely difficult to disobey orders from an authority figure, even 
when the orders are destructive and absurd.   
A disquieting consequence of Milgram’s experiments is that any 
morality that requires disobedience to authorities when they issue 
destructive orders is, in the sense we’ve been discussing, “unrealistic”:  
most people apparently find it excruciatingly difficult to disobey an 
authority figure to his face.  But any defensible morality will require 
defiance under such circumstances.  It follows that realism cannot, by 
itself, be a criterion for judging ethical theories.  Ultimately, the charge of 
psychological unrealism is a legitimate objection to a moral theory only if 
we have other, substantive grounds to doubt the theory’s prescriptions, as 
we clearly do not when the prescription is “don’t inflict major damage on 
an innocent person merely because your boss tells you that that is your 
job.”   Contrary to Woolley and Wendel, psychological realism is not an 
independent evaluative ground for ethical theories. 
A clarification is in order to distinguish the preceding discussion of 
“unrealism” in ethics from a similar-sounding but actually quite different 
debate familiar in the contemporary literature of moral theory.  For four 
decades, philosophers have debated the so-called “demandingness 
objection,”, according to which it counts against a moral theory that it 
places enormous demands on people.  Bernard Williams originally raised 
this as an objection to utilitarianism, which seemingly requires us to spend 
every waking moment maximizing utility, leaving no space for projects 
that matter to us simply because they matter to us.20  The demandingness 
objection often arises in discussions of our obligations to aid distant 
others:  the “bottom billion” of desperately impoverished people in the 
developing world.21  But it can also arise in connection with supposed 
obligations to “live green,” reduce your carbon footprint, eat only locally 
                                                                                                                                          
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/7457780/French-
contestants-torture-each-other-on-TV-Game-of-Death.html.  For a video, see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCamiWs-KMs&NR=1&feature=fvwp.   
20  See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST 110, 115-16 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1970).  As Gilbert Harman 
vividly puts it, “Consider your own present situation.  You are reading a philosophical 
book on ethics.  There are many courses of action open to you that would have much 
greater social utility….According to utilitarianism, therefore, you are not now doing what 
you ought morally to be doing and this will continue to be true through your life [unless 
you drop everything and devote yourself to life-saving activities].”  GILBERT HARMAN, 
THE NATURE OF MORALITY:  AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 157 (1977). 
21  Perhaps the best-known example of a moral argument that invites the demandingness 
objection is Peter Singer’s famous Famine, Affluence, and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
229 (1972), which argues that residents of wealthy countries have stringent moral 
obligations to contribute to famine relief to a point far beyond anything we ordinarily 
recognize.  One well-known attempt to work out the demandingness objection is SAMUEL 
SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982); a recent effort in the context 
of global aid is GARRETT CULLITY, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF AFFLUENCE (2004).   
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grown vegetables, avoid products made by child laborers, and the like.22  
Who wants to spend hours each week finding out where your vegetables 
come from?  There are strong arguments that the demandingness objection 
really does offer a legitimate critique of overbearing moral obligations.  
Plainly, the demandingness objection bears a family resemblance to the 
objection that a moral theory imposes unrealistic demands on agents.  
Would it be inconsistent to accept the demandingness objection but not the 
unrealism objection? 
I think not, because the two objections are less related than they seem.  
In its basic form, the demandingness objection arises in connection with 
obligations that seem to know no bounds—paradigmatically, “positive” 
obligations to aid others.  You can always spare another dollar to the 
needy; you can always volunteer another evening.  (Oscar Wilde 
supposedly said that the trouble with socialism is that it takes up too many 
evenings.)  Here, the impossibility of cabining the obligation seems like a 
strong objection to regarding it as a legitimate moral expectation.  But 
theories of legal ethics like Simon’s and mine are not like this.  They don’t 
feature positive obligations or obligations to aid others at their core; and 
they don’t impose Obligations Without Borders.23  They are unrealistic in 
a different sense, namely that they may create awkward moments of 
saying no to clients and partners on a more frequent (but not super-
frequent) basis than lawyers have to do now. 
Awkward moments, though, are hardly an objection to a view of 
lawyers’ ethics, and they do not support the suspicion that an ethical view 
that generates awkward moments is unrealistic.  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct are filled with rules that contemplate awkward 
moments.  A lawyer whose client commits perjury must urge the client to 
voluntarily rectify it, letting the client know that if she doesn’t the lawyer 
will.24  A lawyer “should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the 
prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.”25  Lawyers must 
tell people who pay their fees to represent a third party that the fee-payer 
has absolutely no say in the representation.26  Corporate counsel 
sometimes has to give “Miranda warnings” to powerful executives, telling 
them that she represents the company, not the executives, and won’t 
ives’ confidences.necessarily keep the execut
                                                       
27  Likewise, corporate 
 
22  Judith Lichtenberg, Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the “New Harms,” 120 
ETHICS (forthcoming April 2010)(page proofs on file with author). 
23  I consider and respond to versions of the demandingness and unrealism objections in 
DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 139-44 (1988), in the section 
titled “Is It Too Much to Ask?”. 
24  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) cmt. 10 (2007) [hereinafter 
MODEL RULES]. 
25  MODEL RULES R. 2.1 cmt. 1. 
26  See MODEL RULES R. 5.4(c). 
27  See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(f). 
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counsel may have to go over the head of her boss to report misconduct to 
higher authority within the corporation.28  Law firm associates must refuse 
partners who tell them to do things that the associate knows to be unlawful 
or unethical, for example backdating a document to cover up the partner’s 
missing a deadline.29  A lawyer must blow the whistle to disciplinary 
authorities if she “knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to 
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other 
respects”; that includes lawyers in her own firm.30  So even the regulatory 
framework that Woolley and Wendel believe lies at the heart of legal 
ethics is unrealistic in the sense that it can require lawyers to have very 
difficult conversations, the kind that leave you sleepless the night before 
and make your heart pound when you pick up the telephone. 
 None of this is to say that worries about realism play no part in 
ethics.  Sometimes we excuse people for doing the wrong thing in the face 
of psychological pressure.  This is equivalent to excusing them because—
given their personality and the psychological pressure they are under—
holding them to a rigorous moral standard is unrealistic.  But excuses 
cannot become so universal that they amount to a blanket “Get Out of 
Conscience Free” card, as they would if the charge of “being 
psychologically unrealistic” were invariably allowed to pare back the 
scope of obligation.  In my own analysis of the Milgram experiments, I 
distinguish between situations in which psychological pressure can excuse 
wrongful behavior from those in which it cannot on the basis of whether 
the psychological disposition exploited by the pressure is morally 
creditable or morally discreditable.31 Whether or not my analysis is 
                                                        
28  See MODEL RULES R. 1.13(b). 
29  See MODEL RULES R. 5.2(a); see also MODEL RULES R. 8.4(c). 
30  MODEL RULES R. 8.3(a). 
31 LUBAN, supra note 18, at 253-60.  The inspiration behind this distinction is Victoria 
Nourse’s analysis of the heat-of-passion defense in criminal law, which can mitigate 
murder charges to manslaughter.  Nourse proposes that the heat-of-passion defense is 
legitimately available to the parent who shoots his daughter’s rapist, but should not be 
available to the man who shoots his girlfriend when she announces that she is leaving 
him.  Of course the homicide is wrong in both cases.  But the murderous disposition in 
the former case tracks a legitimate moral judgment that the rapist deserves punishment; in 
the latter case, the murderous disposition tracks an illegitimate moral judgment that his 
girlfriend is a kind of property that has no right to leave him. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s 
Progress, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1390-93 (1997). On my analysis, deference to authority in 
the Milgram scenario can ultimately be traced to a morally discreditable disposition to 
value our own favorable self-image to an excessive degree.  That is because I follow 
Milgram in diagnosing the obedience phenomenon as a consequence of the step-by-step 
increments in the shocks.  For a subject to break off at a high level would involve 
recognition by the subject that the nearly-as-high shocks he or she had been 
administering are wrong, and that would be admitting horrible moral error.  “For,” as 
Milgram writes, “if he breaks off, he must say to himself:  ‘Everything I have done to this 
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correct, it seems clear that some distinction must be drawn between ethical 
theories that are objectionably unrealistic and those about which the 
response to the charge of unrealism must be:  “Tough luck:  realistic or 
not, this is what morality requires.”  In either case, psychological 
unrealism properly belongs in a theory of excuses, not in the set of criteria 
for evaluating ethical theories. 
A related objection to using unrealism as a criterion for criticizing 
moral theories is that it may lead us to set our sights too low.  There is a 
familiar argument in criminal law that publicizing the defense of duress 
would make people less reluctant to give in to pressure to commit crime 
(because they know the defense is available), and thus would lead to too 
much crime.32   I am suggesting an analogous concern here:  that 
overemphasis on people’s psychological resistance to moral requirements 
will lead us to conclude that lawyers are never obligated to follow them. 
Finally, I’d like to reemphasize a point I made earlier in connection 
with Woolley and Wendel’s critique of Simon.  Part of what makes 
complying with so-called “high commitment” theories of legal ethics33 
psychologically difficult is this:  we imagine that the lawyer who adopts 
Simon’s view or mine is all alone in a law firm where nobody else has 
adopted the same view.  Of course it is psychologically difficult being the 
lone dissenter.  But perhaps the right question is not, “Is it psychologically 
realistic for a lawyer to follow Luban’s or Simon’s injunctions in a legal 
environment where other lawyers mostly accept the standard conception?”  
Perhaps a better question is, “Is it psychologically realistic for a lawyer to 
follow Luban’s or Simon’s injunctions in a legal environment where the 
other lawyers mostly accept ‘high commitment’ ethics?” 
This observation suggests that the best focus on ethical reformers is on 
institutions and laws, not individual moral exhortation of lawyers (of 
course the two are not mutually exclusive)—a point that Woolley and 
Wendel themselves make.34  As Judith Lichtenberg has argued, perhaps 
the time has come to stop arguing about moral demandingness and, 
instead, ask how institutions can harness psychology on behalf of high 
                                                                                                                                          
point is bad, and I now acknowledge it by breaking off.’  But, if he goes on, he is 
reassured about his past performance.”  MILGRAM, supra note 18, at 149. 
32  Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 632-34 (1984). 
33   The term is Simon’s:  William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism 
Without Monopoly, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 639, 654-55 (2003) (referring to “ethics 
reflecting a high level of commitment to third party and public interests”).  Both his 
ethical theory and mine would qualify as “high commitment” in this sense. 
34  See Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 37. 
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commitment ethics.35 
One way to do this is by changing ethics regulations and other laws so 
that morally difficult behavior is backed by the force of law, and lawyers 
can tell clients or others, “I could lose my license for doing that….”  
Woolley and Wendel mention the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, with its “reporting 
up the line” requirement for lawyers confronting possible client fraud.36  
They might also have noted that Sarbanes-Oxley drove the American Bar 
Association to amend Model Rule 1.13(b) so it conforms to Soxley’s 
requirement.  In recent years, other rule changes have brought the Model 
Rules into closer alignment with proposals of “high commitment” 
ethicists—for example, by broadening MR 1.6(b) to include 
confidentiality exceptions ranging over a wider category of client 
wrongdoing, and adding MR 3.8(g) and (h) to make prosecutors reveal 
evidence of wrongful convictions. 
These amendments raise an interesting question:  how did the bar 
decide that the new rules are superior to their predecessors?  In my 
opinion, it is no coincidence that these recent rule changes all align with 
high commitment ethics, nor that they mostly align with common (i.e., 
extra-professional or “lay”) morality.  Under common morality, it is 
wrong for a lawyer to keep confidential the knowledge that a client is 
about to swindle someone out of their life savings, and it is wrong that a 
prosecutor might conceal new evidence that an innocent person is rotting 
in prison.  On my account of legal ethics, the gap between professional 
morality and common morality should shrink, and in this sense the new 
regulations reflect right answers.  It is noteworthy that the organized bar 
has not always agreed, and in the case of broadening exceptions to 
confidentiality, the bar notoriously dug its heels in for decades to defend 
the wrong answer.  One virtue of revisionary conceptions of ethics is that 
they may provide criteria and perhaps even impetus for law reform that a 
legal ethics centering on “civil obedience” to existing regulations does not. 
 
C.  REALISM AND DETERMINISM 
 
Ultimately, the main criticism that ethical theories such as Simon’s 
and mine are unrealistic seems to be that the facts of psychology set limits 
to moral choice.  A fundamental difference between Woolley and 
Wendel’s theory of agency and my own is that they appear to be 
determinists while I am not.  They are less than entirely clear on this issue.  
 approval psychologist David Matsumoto’s 
tion of forces … determine how individuals 
At one point they discuss with
claim that a “complex interac
                                                        
35   Judith Lichtenberg, Famine, Affluence, and Psychology, in PETER SINGER, UNDER 
FIRE: THE MORAL ICONOCLAST FACES HIS CRITICS 229 (Jeffrey A. Schaler ed., 2009); 
but see Peter Singer, Reply by Peter Singer, in id. at 259. 
36  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 37. 
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actually think or behave at any particular moment in time. Situational 
factors and personality together determine behavior….”37  This is the 
language of determinism. 
Later in the same paragraph, Woolley and Wendel amend 
Matsumoto’s “situation plus personality determine behavior” model to a 
somewhat more complex one, adding “that it is not only personality, 
morality and/or situation that will determine that individual’s actions,” but 
also “affective states,”38 that is, emotional states.  In one way, this is 
simply another version of determinism—affective states and morality join 
with personality and situation to determine behavior.  But the claim is a bit 
more than that, because Woolley and Wendel include morality among the 
factors that “affect how she responds to a particular circumstance, and 
how she chooses to act in that circumstance.”39 Here they sound less 
determinist, because they speak not only of “how she responds” but also 
“how she chooses,” and apparently morality affects how she chooses.  
Though it has overtones of determinism, this is closer to the language of 
free will. 
I regard the entire subject of ethics as having to do with choice, and 
thinking about choice—that is, about what I should choose, here and 
now—requires me to suppose that I can make a choice.  That is the 
practical standpoint, and I accept Kant’s argument that adopting the 
practical standpoint requires us to postulate our own freedom to choose.40  
Viewed from the practical standpoint, morality is not just one 
deterministic factor among others, bumping me wherever the forces 
resolve.  Rather, morality is something that lays a claim on me, which I 
must decide whether to honor or not.  Morality enters the stage precisely 
when determinism exits, at the moment when we adopt the practical 
t the right thing to do. standpoint and try to puzzle ou
                                                        
37  Id. at 10. 
38  Id.  
39  Id. 
40  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788), reprinted in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 6, at  246, *5:132; see HENRY E. ALLISON, KANT’S THEORY OF 
FREEDOM 40-41 (1990).  As I have written elsewhere,  
This point is less mysterious than it sounds. A theoretical belief in determinism 
is perfectly superfluous from the practical point of view. Suppose you are trying 
to decide whether to do your laundry now or tomorrow. As a determinist, you 
are convinced that you have no freedom to choose on this or any other issue: que 
sera, sera. What next? Do you simply settle back in your chair and say to 
yourself, "I await the inevitable workings of the laws of physics!" as though you 
are a marionette waiting for the puppet master to jerk your strings? Plainly, that 
is simply a bizarre way of deciding not to do your laundry now. From the 
practical standpoint, determinism is always one thought too many. 
David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience: A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1437, 1441 n. 27 (2008). 
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II. “FUNCTIONAL” AND “DESIRABLE” 
 
Recall that Woolley and Wendel aim to evaluate conceptions of how a 
lawyer must be according to whether they are realistic, functional, and 
desirable.  Having discussed the criterion of realism, I now turn to the 
questions of whether Simon’s theory or mine presupposes a lawyer with a 
dysfunctional or undesirable personality.  My answer is no. 
 
A.  “FUNCTIONAL” 
 
I take it that by asking whether “how a lawyer must be” under a given 
ethical theory is functional, they mean to ask whether a lawyer who is 
“like that” will function well in typical workplace settings, where 
“function well” means two things:  well for the lawyer and well for the 
organization.  They obviously think that the answer is no for Simon. They 
portray the ideal lawyer in Simon’s ethics as a maverick who does not 
play well with others.  She is “disagreeable,” and may even be “incapable 
of a healthy existence within an institutional context.”41  They may think 
the answer is no for me as well.  For, like Simon, my lawyer “is extremely 
mistrustful of claims of authority to obedience,”42 and she “will be 
required to think and justify her actions in terms of a conceptual 
vocabulary that is disfavored in the environment in which she works,” 
because she uses the language of morality, to which large-firm lawyers are 
distinctively averse.43 
Now in one way these arguments are similar to the argument about 
psychological realism:  they presuppose that the “high commitment” 
lawyer is working in a law firm staffed almost entirely by non-high 
commitment lawyers.  But it is not clear that asking about functionality 
under this assumption is the right question.  As suggested earlier, Woolley 
and Wendel should ask whether the high commitment lawyer is functional 
in a law firm of the like minded. 
After all, if an institution is designed so that functioning ethically 
within it requires undesirable traits, why should we use this as a criticism 
of the ethical theory rather than a criticism of the organization?  The years 
 on one end and the financial crash on the 
izations that rewarded irresponsibility, risk 
framed by the Enron collapse
other were filled with organ
                                                        
41  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 22. 
42  Id. at 26. 
43  I’m not entirely guilty as charged here.  Although I have occasionally described client 
counseling as moral dialogue, I am also on record with the following:  “And client 
counseling, in turn, means discussing with the client the rightness or wrongness of her 
projects, and the possible impact of those projects on ‘the people,’ in the same matter-of-
fact and (one hopes) unmoralistic manner that one discusses the financial aspects of a 
representation.” LUBAN, supra note 22, at 173 (emphasis added). 
  14
taking, greed, and dishonesty.  It may be that honesty is not “functional” in 
such an institution, but why think that is a strike against honesty rather 
than a strike against the institution? 
Woolley and Wendel might respond that no organization can tolerate 
employees who are habitually mistrustful of authority and are willing to 
break the rules.  However, I don’t think matters are so clear. 
On the first point, I find Woolley and Wendel’s description of my own 
view as mistrustful of authority slightly misleading because it is 
ambiguous.  I do not mean that those who run organizations are usually 
bad enough to warrant mistrust—that would be a baseless and paranoid 
thing to believe, and I nowhere assert it.  Rather, I believe that the division 
of labor and knowledge in complex organizations, combined with well-
known organizational dynamics such as “groupthink,” can lead to 
organizational misdeeds that nobody in the organization recognizes as 
such.44  Lawyers should mistrust authority only in the sense that they 
should try to become aware of whether their own judgment has become 
unhinged by the organization’s culture or structure; in this sense, 
mistrusting authority is the flip side of a certain kind of self-mistrust:  the 
self-scrutiny and skepticism of which Socrates is the exemplar—the 
simple commandment to stop and think.45  Can an organization tolerate 
people who stop and think?  I see no reason why not; a better question is 
whether organizations can tolerate people who don’t. 
What about people prepared to break rules?  That is a harder question, 
and the answer will turn on the nature and purpose of the organization—
some require tighter chains of command and greater obedience than 
others.  This is more than I can go into here.  Suffice it to note that even 
armies require soldiers to disobey orders if they are manifestly illegal, and 
often encourage improvisation and exercise of judgment among officers in 
the field.  Law firms obviously have looser chains of command than 
armies and generally provide lawyers with significant autonomy.  I am 
unpersuaded that either the organizational structure of law firms or the 
regulatory system would be damaged by lawyers who exercise 
independent moral as well as professional judgment.  
                                                        
44 See LUBAN, supra note 18, at 267-97; David Luban, Making Sense of Moral 
Meltdowns, in LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL 
READER 357 (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005), revised in MORAL LEADERSHIP:  THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF POWER, JUDGMENT, AND POLICY (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2006); see 
also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 941 (2007); Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities 
Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629 (1997). 
45  See LUBAN, supra note 18, at 296-97.  My philosophical inspiration here is HANNAH 
ARENDT, Thinking and Moral Considerations, in RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT 159 
(Jerome Kohn ed., 2003). 
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Woolley and Wendel write, “Assuming it is possible to reform the 
cultures of law firms, government offices, and in-house legal departments, 
the last thing one would want in a lawyer is a disposition to regard 
established rules and procedures as optional guidelines, to be disregarded 
whenever the lawyer believed justice or morality would be better 
served.”46  This is an ingenious argument, which seems to turn the tables 
on soi disant ethics reformers like Simon and me by showing that our 
theories may actually be the enemies of successful reform.  But it is not a 
sound argument, because it begs crucial questions. 
First, it begs the question of whether the best way to reform 
organizational culture would in fact be to create channels for lawyers to 
exercise greater independent moral judgment; Woolley and Wendel seem 
to assume that the answer is no, but it is not obvious why.  Second, 
Woolley and Wendel’s argument begs the question whether the reformed 
organization would be more just and moral, so that the need to disregard 
procedures would diminish and the problem they raise become less urgent.  
Again, they apparently assume that the answer is no—although it is 
unclear in that case what the “reform” was meant to accomplish.  Third, 
they assume that the reform is thorough enough “that following the 
procedures will do better in the long run, as compared with relying on the 
judgment of individuals.”47  That is not true of all reforms, and Woolley 
and Wendel have not actually shown that it is true of any.  Fourth, and 
most obviously, the argument starts with the “assume a can opener” 
nonchalance often attributed to economists: “Assuming it is possible to 
reform the cultures….” What if the cultures have not been reformed, or 
not reformed adequately?  Do we still want lawyers who follow orders and 
stick to the rules?  Why is that “functional”? 
 
B.  “DESIRABLE” 
 
Finally, Woolley and Wendel suggest that the personality traits and 
dispositions that go with high commitment ethics may be undesirable. 
“The point here is not to ask whether the acts prescribed, if accomplished, 
would be desirable. But it is to ask whether the type of lawyer who would 
be able to accomplish those acts in a given case is the type of lawyer we 
would want to have across every case, across the totality of the legal 
system as a whole.”48 
This is indeed an intriguing and important question, but unfortunately 
Woolley and Wendel do not answer it.  Instead, they argue that the type of 
on is rare—“ a complex of personal lawyer presupposed by Sim
                                                        
46  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 33. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 32. 
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characteristics that occurs only infrequently, in the form of exceptionally 
courageous and individualistic people.”49  This is not an argument that 
Simon’s ideal lawyer’s traits are undesirable.  On the contrary, it is an 
argument that they are more desirable than we dare hope. 
The nearest that Woolley and Wendel come to arguing that the ideal is 
undesirable is this:  “the type of person who can resist the pressures of 
institutional compliance, cannot function easily within an institution. Her 
dispositional capacity to resist institutional compliance makes institutional 
compliance something she cannot do well or easily.”50  On its face, this 
seems plausible; but on closer reflection, I am not convinced. 
Note first that Woolley and Wendel seem to equate desirable 
personality traits with those that facilitate institutional compliance.  Surely 
that is not true of all institutions.  Indeed, this seems like an argument 
about functionality (in the sense discussed earlier) rather than desirability. 
More importantly, Woolley and Wendel seem to be trading on an 
equivocation.  They refer to a lawyer’s “dispositional capacity to resist 
institutional compliance.”  Which is it, disposition or capacity?  My 
theory, like Simon’s, does assume a capacity to resist institutional 
compliance when morality or justice requires it.  But it doesn’t assume a 
disposition to resist institutional compliance, in the everyday sense of 
being a contrarian, a know-it-all, a temperamental anarchist, a pain in the 
neck.  Institutional compliance probably is something that the House 
Contrarian “cannot do well or easily,” but my version of moral activism 
doesn’t require you to be the House Contrarian, and I don’t think Simon’s 
theory does either.  Blurring together disposition and capacity into 
“dispositional capacity” makes their argument look plausible, but it 
conceals a logical jump from the proposition that a lawyer has the capacity 
to resist institutional compliance (when she should) to the proposition that 
she has a disposition to do so even when she shouldn’t.  Nothing entitles 
them to the jump. 
The word “disposition” is something of a term of art within both 
philosophy and psychology.  In ordinary language, we usually use the 
word to refer to someone’s overall personality, as in the sentence “She has 
a sunny disposition.”  In philosophy, by contrast, a disposition is 
understood in a more fine-grained way as a propensity to behave in a 
specific way:  for example, ordinary window-glass has a disposition (i.e. 
propensity) to shatter when struck by a flying brick.  Human dispositions 
in this sense are psychological states linking act or behavior types to 
specific stimuli, as in this kind of ordinary language usage:  “He tends to 
to become irrational) when he sees his ex-
ere, disposition-talk is not a broad brush 
lose it (i.e. has a disposition 
wife with another man.”  H
                                                        
49   Id. at 33. 
50  Id. at 36. 
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description of someone’s overall character, but rather a narrow 
explanation of particular behavior.51 
Ethicists typically use the term “dispositions” to describe something in 
between the broad and the narrow:  character traits such as cautiousness or 
its opposite, recklessness; and, especially, character traits that are morally 
significant, such as courage or honesty (or their opposites, spinelessness 
and mendacity).  These are what we ordinarily label virtues and vices; 
philosophically, the idea of regarding virtues as dispositions to perform 
acts of a certain kind (e.g., courageous or honest acts) derives from 
Aristotle.52  They are “dispositions” in the philosophical sense of 
propensities to behave in certain ways, but they span whole categories of 
behavior rather than highly specific behaviors like “losing it when he sees 
his ex-wife with another man.”53 
Woolley and Wendel have somewhat contradictory views about the 
ethicist’s and psychologist’s in-between notion of dispositions:  at one 
point in their article they criticize the notion of moral character, which 
seems “neither identifiable nor predictive of conduct.”54  Earlier, however, 
they define dispositions—which, as we’ve seen, belong to the apparatus of 
their own favored theory—as “[u]niversal dispositions such as courage, 
honesty, justice, respect for dignity and equality of others, as well as role 
dispositions or virtues, such as zealousness or fidelity.”55   As far as I can 
see, universal dispositions are character traits, nothing more and nothing 
less, and I am left unsure whether Woolley and Wendel believe in them or 
not; I assume they do, given their references to virtues such as courage and 
fidelity. 
A virtue like courage might plausibly be called a dispositional 
capacity, because it is—in the sense just described—a disposition, and it is 
also a capacity in the sense that it makes certain things possible.  But what 
is courage?  The traditional understanding of courage, like other virtues, is 
Aristotle’s assertion that it is the mean between two extremes (in this case 
                                                        
51  There are serious questions about whether dispositions are genuine properties, and also 
about the explanatory usefulness of dispositions, which often seem circular.  (“He lost his 
temper because he has a disposition to lose his temper” doesn’t really explain very 
much.)  These issues are not to the point here. 
52  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 
1736, Bk. I, ch.8, 1098b33 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).  In this translation the word 
“state” translates the Greek word hexis, usually translated by “disposition.” 
53  This is also the way that social psychologists use the term “disposition.”  See, e.g., 
Edward E. Jones, The Rocky Road From Acts to Dispositions, 34 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
107, 107 (1979). 
54  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 34.   
55  Id. at 11. 
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cowardice and recklessness).56  This is an important idea, because it 
highlights what’s wrong with Woolley and Wendel’s argument that 
someone with a dispositional capacity to resist authority will not be able to 
obey authority well or easily.  For an Aristotelian, the virtuous person is 
one who obeys when it is appropriate and disobeys when it is appropriate, 
and who knows one from the other.57  That is the mean between being 
stubbornly contrarian and being mindlessly servile.  Woolley and Wendel 
seem to presume that no such mean exists:  if you have the capacity to 
disobey on the right occasions, it will also be a disposition to disobey on 
the wrong occasions.  I don’t see why this conclusion is correct. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
At one point, Woolley and Wendel write that “Simon and Luban… 
rely on lawyers to be relentlessly focused on justice or morality.”58  This 
paints a grim picture of lawyers dragging justice and morality around like 
a ball and chain, or perhaps burning with the fanatical, moralistic zeal of 
latter-day Savonarolas.  I certainly don’t see matters that way.  By and 
large, lawyers do not go frantically through life encountering one moral 
dilemma after another like challenges in a video game.  Lawyers like to 
think that they do good in the world, and by and large I see no reason to 
doubt it.  My theory requires that lawyers be “relentlessly focused” on 
morality only in the sense that they cannot hide behind their role or the 
adversary system to release themselves from moral obligations that they 
would have if they weren’t lawyers.  They need be no more relentlessly 
focused on morality than non-lawyers are. 
In one sense, morality is relentless, in that it sets out ideals that 
nobody fully complies with.  I have done discreditable things in my life 
and—without meaning any disrespect to the reader—so have you.  Perfect 
rectitude might actually require a kind of saintliness that is not necessarily 
the all-round best life for a human being.59  Where morality fits in with 
art, sports, love, fun, and excitement—not to mention failure, heartbreak, 
and other losses in a well-lived life—is not wholly obvious, and it is not 
an issue that legal ethicists typically address.  If you write a book on 
al, it will inevitably appear that it demands ethics, setting out a moral ide
                                                        
56  See Aristotle, supra note 52, at 1747-48, Bk. II, ch. 6, 1106b14-1107a3 (on virtue as 
the mean between extremes); id. at 1748, Bk. II, ch. 7, 1107a32-1107b3 (courage as the 
mean between rashness and cowardice). 
57 Aristotle asserts that the mean that constitutes virtue is “the intermediate not in the 
object but relatively to us,” id. at 1747, Bk. II, ch. 6, 1106b5-6, i.e., the appropriate; and 
earlier he states that “the agents themselves must in each case consider what is 
appropriate to the occasion.”  Id. at 1744, Bk. II, ch. 2, 1104a7-8. 
58  Woolley & Wendel, supra note 1, at 32. 
59   The classic treatment of this subject is Susan Wolf, Moral Saints, 79 J. PHIL. 419 
(1982); see also SUSAN WOLF, MEANING IN LIFE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2010). 
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saintliness and a relentless focus on morality.  But that is an illusion born 
simply of the fact that it is (after all) an ethics book.  Perhaps, then, it is 
not necessary to ask not only what a lawyer must do but what that means a 
lawyer must be—because the things a lawyer must be are not exhausted by 
ethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
